Rapid technological developments and deregulation of the telecommunications industry have changed the way in which content providers distribute and price their goods and services. Instead of selling a bundle of content and access through proprietary networks, these firms are shifting their distribution channels to the Internet. In this new setting, the content and Internet service providers find themselves in a relationship that is simultaneously cooperative and competitive. We find that proprietary content providers prefer the Internet channels to direct channels only if the access market is sufficiently competitive. Furthermore, maintaining a direct channel in addition to the Internet channels changes the equilibrium enough that the proprietary content providers prefer having the Internet channels regardless of the level of competition in the access market. Telecommunications technology developments uniformly increase content providers profit. On the other hand, the technology impact on Internet Service Provider profits is non monotonic: their profits may increase or decrease as a result of lower telecommunication costs. While initially the ISP profit increases as more customers are drawn to the Internet, it eventually decreases as the spatial competition becomes more intense. We also show that proprietary content providers should benefit from having some free content available at the Internet Service Providers' sites to induce more customers to join the Internet.
Introduction
Many firms, such as Dialog, Bloomberg, Lexis/Nexis, WestGroup, Medfirst, and First Search, have been providing on-line data covering financial, legal, medical, and academic journal publications, respectively. These and other similar firms have near monopolies in the content they offer. We classify the content over which such a firm has a near monopoly as proprietary and call the firm a proprietary content provider (PCP).
Before Internet access became common, the PCPs sold a bundle of access and data services. They had to establish direct channels using gateways for their customers and set the prices for the bundle. The rapid proliferation of the Internet provides a new channel for distributing proprietary content. PCPs now use the Internet to deliver data to customers all over the world since the price of telecommunication on the Internet is not distance dependent. The Internet Service Providers (ISPs) provide the customers with access to the Internet and the PCP.
Some customers get on the Internet in order to access the proprietary content provided by the PCP, while others use only the free content and services available on the Internet as part of ISP services.
The ISPs compete aggressively for customers to provide Internet access and nonproprietary data [Denton, 1997] . In the new channel the PCPs and the ISP independently set the prices for their services. Hence they compete for a share of the surplus created when the customers get access to content and services. Furthermore, because access and data services are complements, the ISPs and the content providers find themselves in a relationship of both competition and voluntary cooperation.
In this paper we examine three sets of issues relating to the provision of proprietary content and access on the Internet: Several studies have focused on the impact of Internet-enabled electronic commerce on the retail industry. For instance, Bakos examines the impact of electronic markets on the search costs and equilibrium among producers of a differentiated good [Bakos, 1997] . The new role of intermediation in electronic markets has also been studied [Bailey a nd Bakos, 1998 ]. A few other researchers have looked at the provision of content in the Internet industry. McKnight and Bailey provide an overview of technological, economics, and policy-based research on the Internet industry [McKnight and Bailey, 1998 ]. Other aspects of the same industry have been examined by Dewan, Freimer, and Seidmann [Dewan, Freimer, and Seidmann, 1998 ]. MackieMason, et al, consider the impact of content-sensitive pricing of telecommunication services on the variety of content available, the consumer surplus, and the profit of the network provider [Mackie-Mason, Shenker, and Varian, 1996] . From another perspective, a number of researchers in library sciences have been studying the impact of the Internet on document publishing, search, and access [Fletcher, 1996] and [Duranceau, 1995] .
The issues analyzed here are somewhat different from those generally examined in most of the electronic commerce papers cited above. We concentrate only on information goods, goods that are delivered electronically and at a zero marginal cost of production and no information asymmetry. We develop a spatial competition model that captures the economic and technological relationship among the access and content providers. Our results explain the complex interplay between the pricing decisions of the ISPs and the PCP and show how their profits will be affected by changes in telecommunication dial-up costs, the addition of ISPs, the provision of free content and changes in the relative value of proprietary content. In the next section we present a spatial model of the Internet economy and our key equilibrium results. Section 4 studies the Internet economy when only proprietary content is of value to a segment of customers, and section 5 looks at the competitive implications of providing both proprietary and non-proprietary content on the Internet. Section 6 concludes our paper.
A spatial model of the Internet economy
Customers gain access to the Internet via Internet service providers (ISP.) A common method is to dial up a point of presence of an ISP using a modem. In many countries phone calls are metered for time and distance. The ISP, in turn, connects via a larger-capacity line to a network access point -a connection to the wide-area backbone of the Internet. This arrangement is shown in Figure 1 . This figure also depicts customers who use a direct channel to connect to the PCP via proprietary networks. *** Insert Figure 1*** Customers pick the least expensive way of getting on the Internet. They minimize the sum of dial-up costs and ISP fees. The ISPs take this into account when they set their prices. To capture the impact of distance and ISP fees on the access costs, we use a spatial competition model. The customers are assumed to be located with uniform density on a circle, which without loss of generality is assumed to have a circumference of 2 [Salop 1979 ].
The customers have heterogeneous values for data. The value of information for each customer is drawn from a uniform distribution over the interval [0, 2a] . By combining the variation in location and preference, one can geometrically view the customers as uniformly distributed on a cylinder of circumference 2 and height 2a. To simplify the analysis we assume that the local dial-up cost is c times the distance along the circle to the provider. While in reality the communication cost is a step-wise, non-decreasing function of distance and time, the linear assumption captures the salient tradeoff between distance and ISP fee while maintaining tractability.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that each ISP owns a single point of presence. There are m ISPs, located symmetrically on the circle, each deciding what fees, p, to charge so as to maximize its profit. We assume that they charge a flat non-discriminating charge independent of a customer's location. In addition, the customer pays a telephone company to dial in to the ISP. This is similar to the 'freight-on-board' tariff. The ISPs incur a fixed cost f for providing a point of presence and a variable cost of k c and k i if the customer accesses the PCP or just the ISP, respectively.
Content providers charge a fixed amount p c for providing data to customers who may access the data directly or through the Internet. They in turn incur a fixed cost for providing service, which includes the costs of acquiring, formatting, editing, indexing, and coding data, as well as acquiring and maintaining data servers. To simplify the analysis, we consider just a single type of data, such as law extracts (Lexis/Nexis), medical abstracts (Medfirst), scientific citations and abstracts (First Search), or real-time financial data (Reuters). Firms that provide these data have near monopolies [Jones & Mendelson, 1997.] , because the fixed cost of getting these data online is so high that in equilibrium only a single content provider exists on the network.
We start by finding the simultaneous Nash equilibrium of the competitive game between the ISPs and the PCP where they make decisions to maximize their own profits. Next, we analyze this equilibrium to determine the impact of the Internet developments on content providers, ISPs, and the customers.
The Nash equilibrium between service providers
The equilibrium in the Internet industry is determined by the decisions of three sets of economic agents. These agents have to solve three simultaneous constrained optimization problems as outlined below:
1. Each customer has to pick a specific ISP (location) to minimize the sum of his dial-up fee and the ISP access fee (p). A customer will buy in only if his value from Internet content and services exceeds the sum of his telecom dial-up fee, the ISP access fee, and the content fee (p c ). Otherwise, he will be priced out of the market.
2. Each ISP has to pick a profit maximizing access fee to charge its customers. These decisions must consider the dial-up fees charged by the local phone companies, the access fees of other ISPs, the PCP fee, and the consumers' values for data.
3. The content provider has to determine the profit maximizing content fee given the dial-up fees charged by the local phone companies, the ISP access fees, and the consumers' preference values for data.
The optimization problems discussed above involve three sets of decision variables: ISP assignment by the customers, ISP access fees, and content fees. where p c is the PCP's price, p is the ISP's price, and cx is the local telecommunication cost.
The spatial equilibrium model
We next examine a symmetric Nash equilibrium between ISPs and PCP in a game in which they simultaneously pick prices. We will determine the conditions for these to be in equilibrium.
Customers whose value for proprietary content is less than p c will not access proprietary content. Of these customers, those that find the largest value from accessing a particular ISP to be positive will request its services for non-proprietary content alone. Let ISP i consider charging (4) above refers to the case in which p is low enough that all the customers get on the Internet. The fraction of customers who buy proprietary content is (1 -p c /2a). Equations (5) (6) (7) (8) describe the changes in these market segments as p increases. These are discussed in more detail later. Finally, in (9) the prices are so high that no one gets proprietary content.
Given the fractions of customers determined above, the respective profits (per unit customer density) for the ISPs and PCP are: The PCP and each of the ISPs are simultaneously maximizing their profits. We find five symmetric equilibria. In addition to these, when a is very large, there is a symmetric equilibrium in which none of the providers makes any profit. In this degenerate equilibrium, the providers keep reducing their price to capture other providers' t erritory. Bertrand competition ensues, and the providers will end up making zero profit. This is the situation in the classic model by Hotelling [Hotelling, 1929] In region A, all customers get on the Internet, and those with higher value for content buy it from the PCP. In regions B and C, some customers do not get on the Internet, some get non-proprietary content only and some get both types of content. In region C we find that the telecommunication costs preclude all customers at distant locations from getting on the Internet.
In regions D and E the ISP price is so high that customers get on the Internet only if they want to access proprietary content. In D the PCP price (p c ) is low enough that customers from all locations both proprietary and non-proprietary content. This is not so in region E. No customers get proprietary content in the remaining regions (above and to the right of the bold line in the figure.)
The analysis highlights the complex interplay between the distribution channels for content on the Internet. In the following sections we focus our attention on two interesting cases.
In the first case, the customers predominantly use the Internet for accessing proprietary content (regions D and E in Figure 2 ). This is typical in business usage, where the Internet is used to access specialty databases. In the other case, all locations are served, as the average value of proprietary content exceeds the cost of using Internet for even the most distant locations. This case corresponds to regions A, B and D in Figure 2 .
Only Proprietary Information
In this section we consider the situation when the primary use of the Internet is for accessing 
The equilibrium prices
To model the Internet economy in this special case, we assume that the value of nonproprietary information is negligible. This considerably simplifies the problem and allows us to exhibit some basic structural properties of the equilibrium that also hold in the more general case. • The prices charged by the PCP and the ISP diverge with an increase in a. The PCP, which has a monopoly over its service, raises its price faster than the ISPs which are now in competition. Figure 3 shows that the profits of the content and Internet service providers increase with a, but the PCP profits always increase faster than ISP profits. A decrease in telecommunication costs affects ISPs in two ways:
The impact of increased access to the Internet
• It increases competition among ISPs, and
• lowers telecommunication costs for the consumer.
While the former reduces ISP prices and profits, the latter makes customers more willing to pay for and obtain Internet services, and this increases ISP profits. Note that these two competing effects give the profit versus telecommunication cost curve a unimodal shape. *** Figure PCPs face two key questions:
• When should the PCPs replace their direct channels with Internet channels?
• What is the value of maintaining the direct channel along with the Internet channels?
We start with a direct channel. Consider a locality with a single point of presence by the PCP or its agent. The PCP sets the price for the bundle of access and content services. In contrast, customers using the Internet channel pay three sets of fees: local telecommunication charges, ISP fees, and the fee set by the PCP. In return, the customer gets the same content. As shown in the next theorem, this results in smaller profits for the PCP.
Theorem 2: The proprietary content provider's profit decreases when it replaces all its direct channels with Internet channels if there is no increase in the number of points of presence.
In the early days a PCP would establish a direct channel with a certain number of points of presence to communicate with its customers without using ISPs. Theorem 2 shows that the PCP will be worse off if it replaces its direct channel with the Internet channel when the number of ISPs is equal to or fewer than the number of direct channel points of presence. As discussed earlier, however the number of ISPs and their points of presence are increasing over time. The next theorem identifies when PCPs will make greater profits from using the Internet channels alone. It is worth noting that the predicates in the theorem are relatively mild. The first requires that the Internet have a cost advantage over long distance toll calls, and the second requires that at least some customer finds the proprietary content more valuable than the marginal cost of delivering it via the Internet. Figure 7 for a = 2, c = 1, and f = k c = 0. Note that, for m less than 4, the proprietary content provider prefers the direct channel over using the Internet exclusively. For larger m, it prefers the Internet over using its direct channel alone. *** Insert Figure 7 here *** Putting Theorems 2, and 3 together, we gain insight into at least one of the ways in which the Internet creates value for proprietary content providers. As the number of points of presence from ISPs increases, the PCP can use their reach to increase its market and profits. It is likely that as the number of ISPs increases further PCPs who are not on the Internet now will find it attractive to invest in using the Internet channel.
Theorem 3: If k c < c/2 and k c < 2a, then the proprietary content provider's profit is higher with the Internet channel than with the direct channel if the number of ISPs with points of presence in the locality increases beyond a certain number. Furthermore, if a

Theorems 2 and 3 are illustrated by the example shown in
Another business policy question considered by the PCP is whether to keep its direct channel while also usng the Internet channel. The next theorem addresses this issue, and we show that the PCP's profits increase even with just one additional Internet point of presence by an ISP.
Theorem 4: If the proprietary content provider keeps its direct channels then its profit will increase with even just a single additional Internet point of presence provided by an ISP.
Considering Theorems 3 and 4 together provides insight into the value of having a direct channel even as Internet channels become common. When the direct channel is not maintained, the content provider prefers to use the Internet channels only if there is a sufficient number of ISPs. This is shown in Figure 7 , where at least 5 ISPs need to exist in the locality for the proprietary content provider to prefer the Internet channels. On the other hand, as shown by Theorem 4, if the direct channel is maintained in addition to the Internet channels, even one additional ISP increases content provider's profit. In this example it seems that by keeping its direct channel the PCP disciplines the entire ISP market, which helps the PCP in getting a broader reach.
Proprietary and Non-Proprietary Content
The previous section presents some structural results for the special case when the value of non-proprietary content and services, b, is zero. In this section, we relax this assumption and examine the equilibrium prices, market segments, and profits when there is substantial non- Surprisingly, it also sees a sudden expansion in market demand at the same time that the ISP starts selling services for non-proprietary content. Our analysis shows that this switch occurs because the ISP changes its pricing policy. As the relative value of non-proprietary content gets higher, the ISP lowers its flat tariff to attract these customers as well as serve others who go on to access the PCP. As a result, the derived demand for the PCP increases and its profit increases as shown in figure 9 . This figure shows that the profits of both the ISPs and the PCP increase as the ISPs provide better and better non-proprietary content and services. This is a unique feature of the Internet economy, where the ISP acts as both a conduit and as a competitor to the PCPs. *** Insert Figure 8 here *** *** Insert Figure 9 here *** From the foregoing discussion it becomes clear that even the PCP may have a significant interest in providing some free content to the ISPs as a way to enhance b. In Figure 10 we compute the marginal value-enhancing b to the proprietary content provider.
Interestingly, we see that for the PCP the marginal value of adding free content is unimodal concave with respect to m, the number of ISPs. For example, with smaller m the market for content is still so small that it is not worthwhile for the PCP to make this investment.
For larger m, the ISPs are already competing so effectively that the marginal impact of additional non-proprietary content on the market is small. It is therefore not worthwhile for the PCP to enhance the non-proprietary services at this end of the market.
When the marginal cost of creating non-proprietary content and services is 0.20 (on a per customer basis), the proprietary content provider will find it beneficial to invest in nonproprietary content only for 3 ≤ m ≤ 8. This result provides a significant input into the current debate on the role played by free content on the Internet. Under our modeling assumptions, free content provides its maximum return to the PCP during the intermediate stage of market development. Over time, as the number of ISPs increases, access fees become sufficiently low that the PCP will have to invest less and less in trying to attract customers to join the Internet.
Managerial implications and conclusions
The emergence of the Internet as a ubiquitous service for wide-area telecommunication has had a large impact on providers of on-line financial, market, legal, technical and other proprietary data. The Internet provides many unique advantages as a communication service primarily linking customers through the use of ISPs with each other and with the PCPs in a way that is independent of distance. These features make it attractive for the PCPs to use the Internet as a way to enhance their global reach.
In this paper we determine the equilibrium between customers, ISPs, and proprietary content providers and analyze the impact of channel and content-enhancing policies. We assume that customers looking for proprietary content have to pay local dial-up fees, ISP fees and PCP fees to obtain proprietary content. Some customers may elect to use the Internet by itself and will not pay the PCP. We find five significant equilibria in which the PCPs and ISPs make nonzero profit. Which one of these equilibria arises depends on the average value of the proprietary content, the value of non-proprietary content, the cost structure of the service providers, and the number of ISPs in the market. The ISPs act both as channel members for the PCP and as competitors while directly selling non-proprietary content and services to the customers. We Despite the numerous managerial insights provided by our analysis, it has some limitations that arise from the simplifications needed to make the problem tractable. To begin with, we assume that there is a single proprietary content provider. It might be useful to consider multiple content providers in a horizontally differentiated market. We hypothesize that most of the insights discussed above will hold as long as these providers have sufficiently different content.
Appendix: Theorem Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
First consider the case of spatial competition.
Assume that all ISPs except one and the proprietary content provider (PCP) set prices as hypothesized in the theorem. We will show that the one excepted ISP will also pick the price specified in the theorem.
Let t be the distance from the ISP of the customer who is indifferent between using this ISP and when it charges p c and the ISPs charge p as specified in the theorem. We find that the PCP too has an interior maximum of its profit at p c , as specified in the theorem.
The spatial monopoly case is proved similarly.
QED
Proof of Theorem 2
Let q(p) be the fraction of customers who obtain service if there are m symmetric points of presence with a fee of p. The points of presence may be owned by ISPs or the PCP.
It is easy to see that q(p) is strictly decreasing in p for 0 ≤ p ≤ 2a.
Let p cd be the optimal direct channel price set by the PCP and let p ci and p i be the optimal content and ISP services prices set by the PCP and ISP respectively for the Internet channel. Using monotonicity of q(p) we get:
Furthermore, since p cd is optimal for direct channels:
By combining equations (1) and (2), we have the result.
QED
Proof of Theorem 3
Let π d and π m be the profits for PCP with only a direct channel and with m internet channels (but no direct channel), respectively.
By theorem 2, Solving for m, we get the hurdle exhibited in the theorem.
QED
Proof of Theorem 4
First consider the case when there is no ISP. Let ) ( 
